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A Genetic Surveillance State: Are We One
Buccal Swab Away From a Total Loss
of Genetic Privacy?
CATHERINE ARCABASCIO

INTRODUCTION:
To date, over 15 million people have submitted their genetic sample to a Direct-To-Consumer Genetic testing company ("DTCGTC").2 A person's genetic data is the most fundamental private information one can possess. That makes it an incredibly powerful tool
because an enormous amount of information can be gleaned from a
tiny sample of saliva or other bodily secretion. "Genomic data is special, since it encodes not only our blueprint, but that of our family and
children. The continuing privacy and the security of people's genetic
data, both immediately, and into the long term, is of paramount importance." (Emphasis added)3 "A genome is not your average piece
of data-it is inherently identifiable, it is familial (revealing your genomic data can reveal sensitive information about your family mem1. Catherine Arcabascio is a Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad College of Law. She is a former Brooklyn Assistant District Attorney and also served as
the Director of the Florida Innocence Project, which she co-founded. A heartfelt thanks to
Research Assistants Tonja Vucetic, Yesnela Rodriguez, Elaine Martin, and Bradley Denniston
for their assistance.
2. "More than 15 million people have submitted their DNA to companies like FamilyTreeDNA, 23AndMe and Ancestry.com in recent years. While they represent a small fraction of
all people, the pool of profiles is large enough to allow 60 percent of white Americans - the
primary users of DNA sites in the United States - to be identified through the databases, according to researchers." Heather Murphy, Most White Americans' DNA Can Be Identified
Through Genealogy Databases,N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/
science/science-genetic-genealogy-study.html?module=inhine. These companies have been referred to in articles and other literature as either DTC-GT's or DTC-GTCs. For consistency, this
article will use DTC-GTC. However, direct quotes from other sources that contain DTC-GT will
not be changed.
3. Lauren Friend, Direct-to-ConsumerGenetic Testing, KPMG GLOBAL STRATEGY GROUP
1, 2 (2018), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/08/direct-to-consumer-genetictesting.pdf.
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bers as well), and its value is long-lasting." 4 The privacy concern has
even moved the Department of Defense to issue a warning to its employees regarding the use of DTC-GTCs. In December 2019, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum advising its
employees not to use such companies. Among other concerns, it
stated, ". . .there is increased concern in the scientific community that
outside parties are exploiting the use of genetic data for questionable
purposes, including mass surveillance and the ability to track individuals without their authority or awareness."'
During the past several years, there has been a steep rise in DTCGTCs that are utilized by individuals who are curious about their ancestry, possible genetic disease markers, or tracking down unknown
living relatives. Some of these individuals have also taken their genetic testing results from the DTC-GTCs and submitted the results to
open source genealogical websites like GEDmatch that focus exclusively on genealogical research.6 In some consumers, the curiosity
about their ancestry seems to be irresistible. Others seek answers to
legitimate questions about paternity or genetic markers for disease.
In either case, those questions have driven the urge to submit one's
most private, unique genetic sample to a mostly unregulated and evergrowing "private" database industry, one that now contains millions
of DNA samples.'
By now, the names of these companies are familiar. Ancestry.com and 23andMe are the two most recognizable given the heavy
marketing campaigns they continue to conduct to date.8 It appears
4. Dana A. Elfin, DNA Testing? You Might Want to Wait for More Legal Protection,
LAw (Jan. 7, 2019, 5:40 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sci
ences/DNA-testing-you-might-want-to-wait-for-more-legal-protection.
5. Shawn Snow, Pentagon advises troops to not use consumer DNA kits, citing security
risks, MILITARY TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/2019/12/24/pentagon-ad
vises-troops-to-not-use-consumer-dna-kits-citing-security-risks/.
6. See Sarah C. Nelson, Consumer Genetic Testing Customers Stretch Their DNA Data
BLOOMBERG

Further With Third-Party Interpretation Websites, THE CONVERSATION (June 13, 2019, 11:06

AM), http://theconversation.com/consumer-genetic-testing-customers-stretch-their-DNA-datafurther-with-third-party-interpretation-websites-118248.
7. See generally 23andMe DNA Test Customer Reviews, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.
com/23andMe-DNA-Test-Ancestral-Opt/dpBOlLZ5K87Z/ref=sr_1_3?crid=14B903ZFJPV6A&
keywords=23andme+DNA+testing+kit&qid=1564425377&s=gateway&sprefix=23and%2Caps%
2C154&sr=8-3#customerReviews (last visited July 29, 2019); AncestryDNA: Genetic Ethnicity
Test Customer Reviews, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/AncestryDNA-Genetic-EthnicityTest/dp/BOTRLVKWO/ref=sr 1_1-sspa?crid=14B9Q3ZFJPV6A&keywords=23andme+DNA+
testing+kit&qid=1564426067&s=gateway&sprefix=23and%2Caps%2C154&sr=8-1-spons&psc=
1#customerReviews (last visited July 29, 2019).
8. See 23andMe Launches FirstNational TV Campaign, 23ANDME (Aug. 5, 2013), https://
mediacenter.23andme.com/press-releases/poh-ad-campaign/ (23andMe started its television ad-
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A Genetic Surveillance State
that DTC-GTCs are spending quite a bit of money marketing their
services to those who want to know where their families originated
from, who their relatives are, or what kind of genes they carry for
certain diseases for a minimal amount of money. As of 2017,
23andMe has been able to market different types of tests that identify
genetic markers for illnesses such as Parkinson's, and Alzheimer's to
name a few.' The marketing push and the low cost of testing is not
surprising because the real value of their business is in the extraordinary amount of genetic data they possess and can sell, thereby translating into enormous current and future profits.1 0 Moreover, there
are currently hundreds of private DNA testing companies, as well as
some other free public genetic-matching companies, that provide services other than actual testing to consumers." Additionally, in order
to access these sites, consumers must consent to a host of activities by
these DTC-GTCs through a lengthy and often muddy set of notices.12
Thus, it is of no surprise that the proliferation of DNA samples
accumulated by these private, largely unregulated, companies and organizations have caught the eyes of law enforcement. With millions of
private citizens using them, law enforcement has seized the ability to
obtain genetic information of innocent citizens so that they can create
familial trees from that information to create a list of suspects in either existing or cold cases. Once a law enforcement organization is

&

vertising campaign in 2013); see also Tara Goodin, FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-toConsumer Tests That Provide Genetic Risk Information For Certain Conditions, U.S. FOOD
DRUG ADMIHNISTRATION (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/
fda-allows-marketing-first-direct-consumer-tests-provide-genetic-risk-information-certain-conditions (in 2017, the FDA allowed 23andMe it to market some of its genetic tests for certain
diseases).
9. Tara Goodin, FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Tests That Provide
Genetic Risk Information For Certain Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 6,
2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-allows-marketing-first-directconsumer-tests-provide-genetic-risk-information-certain-conditions.
10. See Lindsey Jones, FDA Regulation Defines Business Strategy in Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Testing, BIOTECH CONNECTION (Oct. 30, 2017), https://biotechconnectionbay.org/viewpoints/fda-regulation-defines-business-strategy-in-direct-to-consumer-genetic-testing/ (the diversifying reasons for consumer interest in DTC genetic testing are estimated to increase its global
market value to $350 million by 2022).
11. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of
the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 35, 35 (2018).
12. See James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey
of the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 39 (2018) ("[w]ith some notable exceptions, these companies
provided little or none of the information required for consumers to make informed decisions
about their privacy . . . [including the] privacy implications of genetic testing, disclosing health
information, and third parties gaining access to an individual's genetic information").
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able to submit their samples to these databases, they can build a DNA
family tree that includes family members who are related as far as the
9th degree." Law enforcement's access to these private databases
raise serious privacy concerns not only for those that submit the samples to the DTC-GTCs, but every member of that family, either living
or not yet born.
Current privacy laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA") simply do not offer sufficient protection in
the DTC-GTC and genealogy research industries, especially against
law-enforcement's uses. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
which is responsible for consumer protection could play a greater role,
but not if it merely applies the same regulations to DNA samples and
data that it does to online sales of typical consumer products such as
clothing and electronics. More importantly, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not offer sufficient protection either. What
consumers are left with is a largely unregulated industry that does not,
and cannot, robustly guarantee the privacy rights of its users and any
other potential stakeholders.
This article will explore these issues and provide suggestions on
how to curb the increasing lack of privacy in genetic data, with a focus
on law enforcement use. Part II of this article starts by providing
background information about the more well-known DTC-GTCs and
genetic research companies. Part III of this article sets forth the general genetic privacy issues that arise when consumers use DTC-GTCs
and genetic research sites, discusses genetic regulation and genetic
management issues, including DTC-GTCs attempts at self-regulation,
consent, anonymity and deidentification concerns. Part IV discusses
genetic privacy and the Fourth Amendment. Part V concludes with
commentary and suggested solutions to the privacy issues raised.
I.

DTC-GTCs

The most well-known and largest DTC-GTCs are Ancestry.com
and 23andMe.com, but there are over 250 of such companies.1 4 Ac-

&

13. SNAPSHOT DNA ANALYsIs, https://snapshot.parabon-nanolabs.coml#kinship (last visited
Aug. 31, 2019).
14. Lauren Friend, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, KPMG GLOBAL STRATEGY
GROUP (Aug. 2018), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/08/direct-to-consumergenetic-testing.pdf; Hazel & Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of the Privacy
Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-ConsumerGenetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J.L.
PUB. POL'Y 35, 43-44 (2018).
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cording to a KPMG report, the global DTC-GTC market value is expected to be valued more than one billion dollars by 2020.15
Ancestry.com started as Ancestry Publishing and has its roots in a
genealogy magazine, but it was not until 2002 that Ancestry.com began providing DNA testing to consumers. 6 By 2018, it had over 10
million DNA profiles in its database and, according to its website, became the largest in the world."
23andMe was founded in 2006 and according to its website, has
"over 5 million genotyped customers."'" Ancestry.com's focus is on
the use of DNA for genealogical purposes. On the other hand,
23andMe not only does genealogical testing, but offers a wide variety
of genetic testing for disease markers.' 9 23andMe is the only DTCGTC that has been approved by the FDA to do more advanced genetic testing for certain disease markers.2 0
Increasingly, "Americans now turn to DTC-GT companies in an
attempt to translate their genetic data into insights into their health,
ancestry and family relationships, lifestyle, as well as an ever-growing
number of additional areas." 2 ' The process is simple. A testing kit can
usually be purchased online at either their site or at sites like Amazon.com. 22 Testing prices vary, but the average test kit price for
23andMe, ranges from $99.99-199.00 (depending on where the consumer purchases it and whether there are sales).23 For example,
15.

Lauren

Friend, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic

Testing, KPMG

GLOBAL STRATEGY

(Aug. 2018), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/08/direct-to-consumergenetic-testing.pdf; see generally KPMG (2019), https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home.html (last visited
July 29, 2019) (Klynfeld, Peat, Markwick, Goerdeler or KPMG, is a global accounting firm and
part of the "big five" of accounting firms).
16. We Help Unlock New Understanding and Meaningful Connections, ANCESTRY (2019),
https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/our-story (last visited July 29, 2019).
17. Id.
18. 23andMe Statistics, Facts & History, REVIEW CHATTER (Nov. 13, 2018), https://
www.reviewchatter.com/statistics-facts-history/23andme.
19. See Rebecca Armstrong, Best DNA Testing Kit 2019: Unravel Your Ancestry,Top TEN
REVIEws (July 16, 2019), https://www.toptenreviews.com/best-DNA-testing-kits.
20. See Lists of Direct-To-Consumer Tests with Marketing Authorization, U.S. Foon
DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/di
rect-consumer-tests#1ist.
21. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of
the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-ConsumerGenetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 35, 37 (2018).
22. Zina Kumok, What to Know Before You Buy a DNA Test, MAGNIFY MONEY (Apr. 13,
2018), https://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/news/DNA-tests-23andme-ancestryDNA-helix
1444682914/.
23. See Find Out What Your DNA Says About Your Health, Traits and Ancestry, 23ANDME,
&

GROUP

https://www.23andme.com/[DNA-health-anc-estry/?utm-_source=google&utm-medium=search-

shopping&utm-campaign=US-evergreensales prsshopping h+a&gclid=EAlaQobChMI66n

2020]

121

Howard Law Journal
23andMe ran a Father's Day special that provided ancestry testing for
just $50.24 On average, however, it costs about $99 to run a DNA sample and get simple ancestry information. 25 Other more in depth testing for genetic markers for certain diseases can run about $199.26
After purchasing the testing kit, it is mailed to the consumer, who
then usually provides either a buccal swab or a saliva sample and returns the kit for testing.27 The DTC-GTC will then post the results of
the test online.2 8
Ancestry.com and 23andMe.com run a heavy advertising rotation.2 9 In 2016, it was reported that Ancestry.com spent $109 million
and 23andMe spent $21 million in advertising.30 23andMe in particular
has targeted younger audiences. In 2017, it ran an ad campaign in
conjunction with the movie, Despicable Me 3, where the character
Gru, does a 23andMe genetic test and ultimately finds out that he has
a brother.3 1
In 2018, 23andMe also ran an aggressive marketing campaign and
was the primary sponsor for the Billboard Music Awards.3 2 During
Ym8254wlVCdbAChOBMAkiEAQYAiABEgKoQ.D_BwE&gcsrc=aw.ds (last visited July 29,
2019) (sale price of $199.00); 23andMe Personal Ancestry DNA Test Kit-Lab Fee Included,
TARGET, https://www.target.com/p/23andme-personal-ancestry-DNA-test-kit-lab-fee-included/
-/A-53450926 (last visited July 29, 2019) (sale price of $99.99).
24. Haley Henschel, 23andMe Father's Day Sale: Save $50 on Amazon, MASHABLE (June
12, 2019), https://mashable.com/shopping/deal-june-12-23andme-health-and-ancestry-kits-onsale-amazon/.
25. Tina H. Saey, What I Actually Learned About My Family After Trying 5 DNA Ancestry
Tests, SCIENCE NEWS (June 23, 2018), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/family-DNA-ancestrytests-review-comparison.
26. Lydia Ramsey, I Revisited My 23andMe Results That Can Now Tell Whether You May
Have an Increased Risk of Cancer- Here's What it Was Like, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 23, 2018,
8:39 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/review-of-23andmes-new-genetic-health-risks-re
ports-2017-4.
27. Should You Get a Home Genetic Test?, HARVARD HEALTH PUBLISHING (Feb. 2019),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/staying-healthy/should-you-get-a-home-genetic-test.
28. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of
the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 35, 38 (2018).
29. See Ancestry TV Commercials, ISPOT.TV (2019), https://www.ispot.tv/brands/dhv/ancestry (last visited July 29, 2019) (for how many Ancestry TV ad campaigns aired in the past 30
days); see also 23andMe TV Commercials, ISPOT.TV (2019), https://www.ispot.tv/brands/Ias/
23andme (last visited July 29, 2019) (for how many 23andMe TV ad campaigns aired in the past
30 days).
30. Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT TECH.
REv. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumerDNA-testing-blew-upl.
31. See Ace Metrix, 23andMe- "Gru's 23andMe Genetic Journey", YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=OIaF-b5yQxs.
32. Ne-Yo, FACEBOOK (May 20, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/NEYO/videos/teamedup-with-23andme-the-billboard-music-awards-this-year-awesome-to-share-wit/101560506796570
12/.

122

[voL. 63:117

A Genetic Surveillance State
the holidays, these marketing campaigns offer even more discounted
rates so more people will give the tests as gifts. As of January 2019,
more than 26 million people had added their genetic profile to one of
four (Ancestry.com, 23andMe, FamilyTreeDNA, MyHeritage) DTCGTCs. 3 The rapid growth of the use of these DTC-GTCs is driven by
the consumer's curiosity and self-empowerment. 34 "A sense of empowerment is a key driver of DTC-GT uptake - 80% of early adopters of DTC-GTC services report a sense of empowerment from their
results, and claim 'curiosity' as a primary motivation. In response,
90% of DTC-GT companies use the emotional appeal of 'empowerment' in their marketing strategies.""
Other companies, such as GEDmatch are free, but do not offer
genetic testing.3 6 Rather, once consumers get their DNA tested by
companies such as Ancestry.com and 23andMe, they can upload their
raw DNA data to GEDmatch and do genealogical comparisons.
GEDmatch users can then potentially connect with other users who
may be related. The reverse is not true. A consumer cannot upload
data from another source to Ancestry.com or 23andme.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that these large DTC-GTCs
have assembled massive databases. Ancestry.com and 23andMe alone
contain the genetic data of over five million and two million customers, respectively.38 What that effectively means is that in the near future, if left unregulated, almost every person living in the U.S of
European descent ultimately will be identified through the irrelatives
using a DTC-GTC or a genealogical website like GEDmatch.3 9 In
33. Antonio Regalado, More Than 26 Million People Have Taken an at-Home Ancestry
Test, Mrr TECH. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612880/more-than26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/.
34. Loredana Covolo et al., Internet-Based Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: A System-

atic Review, 17(12) J. MED. INTERNET REs. (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.jmir.org/2015/12/e279/.
35.

Lauren Friend, Direct-to-ConsumerGenetic Testing, KPMG GLOBAL STRATEGY GROUP

(Aug. 2018), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/08/direct-to-consumer-genetictesting.pdf.
36. See Heather Murphy, What You're Unwrapping When You Get a DNA Test for Christmas, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/science/dna-testing-kitpresent.htnl.
37.

GEDmatch, YOUR DNA GUIDE, https://www.yourDNAguide.com/upload-to-gedmatch

(last visited July 29, 2019).
38. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of
the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 35, 44 (2018).

39. Within a Few Years, 90% of Americans of European Descent Will Be Identifiable from
DNA Through Genealogy Sites, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://khn.org/morning-

breakout/within-a-few-years-90-of-americans-of-european-descent-will-be-identifiable-from-DN
A-through-genealogy-sites/.

2020]

123

Howard Law Journal
2018, Yanic Erlich, former computational geneticist at Columbia University and the chief science officer of MyHeritage, another large
DTC-GTC, conducted a research study using the MyHeritage
database, which at the time contained 1.28 million DNA profiles, less
than either Ancestry.com or 23andMe." Erlich and his team concluded that if a person lives in the United States and is of European
ancestry, there exists a 60% chance that a third cousin or closer relative has a genetic profile in the My Heritage database. 4 1 Moreover,
40% of individuals having Sub-Saharan or African descent would
have a third cousin or closer in the database.4 2 They did the same
study using 30 random profiles using the GEDmatch database and
their results were similar.43 The geneticists concluded that in two or
three years, 90 percent of Americans or European descent would be
identifiable."
Considering the number of people that now have used one of
these DTC-GTCs, 45 odds are that there will soon be enough information in one of these databases to basically identify virtually any person
in the United States through a distant relative.
II.

GENETIC PRIVACY: REGULATION AND
MANAGEMENT

Self-Regulation by DTC-GTCs

a.

Self-regulation is in the best interest of the DTC-GTCs for numerous reasons. The more these businesses can successfully self-regulate, the less governmental oversight they will require. Self-regulation
also apparently is encouraged by the government. "[T]he White
House, Congress, and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") have
encouraged private sector responses to privacy challenges in lieu of
40. Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find Yow DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State Killer Can
Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCIENCE MAGAZINE (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM),

https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-wil-find-you-DNA-search-used-nab-golden-statekiller-can-home-about-60-white.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits to Sharing Genetic Data With F.B.L, N.Y.
TIEs (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/business/family-tree-DNA-fbi.html;
Company Facts, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/company-facts
(last visited Aug. 29, 2019) (noting that Ancestry has tested the DNA of over fifteen million
people). See also Antonio Regalado, More Than 26 Million People Have Taken an at-Home
Ancestry Test, Mrr TECHNOLOGY REv. (Feb. 11, 2019).
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new regulation." 4 6 Additionally, successful self-regulation with respect to privacy issues will gain them more consumer trust.47
On July 31, 2018, the Future of Privacy Forum published the Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing Services.4 8 In a, a
group of DTC-GTCs (23andMe Inc., Ancestry, Helix, MyHeritage,
and Habit) were involved publishing the Best Practices. 4 9 "[T]hese
Best Practices include: (1) Transparency; (2) Consent; (3) Use and
Onward Transfer; (4) Access, Integrity, Retention, and Deletion; (5)
Accountability; (6) Security; (7) Privacy By Design; and (8) Consumer
Education."so
The Best Practices recognize "that Genetic Data is sensitive information that warrants a high standard of privacy protection because
of the following reasons: It may be used to identify predispositions,
disease risk, and predict future medical conditions[;] It may reveal information about the individual's family members, including future
children[;] It may contain unexpected information or information of
which the full impact may not be understood at the time of collection[;
and] It may have cultural significance for groups or individuals.""' In
addition, the Best Practices sets forth guidelines for dealing with law
enforcement requests and states: "Genetic Data may be disclosed to
law enforcement entities without Consumer consent when required by
valid legal process." 5 2
46. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning
and Users' Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 43 (2015), https://lawcat.berkeley.edul
record/1126239?In=en.
47. As will be discussed in Section III b. infra, HIPAA and GINA already impact some of
the services offered by DTC-GTCs and the FDA regulates what tests can be sold to consumers.
Barbara J. Evans, HIPAA's IndividualRight of Access to Genomic Data: Reconciling Safety and
Civil Rights, 102 AM. J. Hum. GENETIcs 5, 5-7 (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC5777935/pdf/main.pdf.
48. Privacy Best Practicesfor Consumer Genetic Testing Services, FUURE OF PRIVACY FoRUM (July 31, 2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Privacy-Best-Practices-for-Con
sumer-Genetic-Testing-Services-FINAL.pdf; see Supporters, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM,
https://fpf.org/about/supporters/ (last visited July 29, 2019) (Ancestry, 23andMe, and Helix, are
listed as corporate supporters of the Future of Privacy Forum. There are many other major
companies and law firms listed as well, including Amazon, Apple, Verizon, Uber, Google, Citigroup, Ropes and Gray and Covington and Burling, to name a few).
49. Carson Martinez, Privacy Best Practicesfor Consumer Genetic Testing Services, FUTURE
OF PRIVACY FORUM (July 31, 2018), https://fpf.org/2018/07/31/privacy-best-practices-for-consumer-genetic-testing-services/?source=post-elevatesequence-page.
50. Privacy Best Practicesfor Consumer Genetic Testing Services, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FoRUM (July 31, 2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Privacy-Best-Practices-for-Con
sumer-Genetic-Testing-Services-FINAL.pdf.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Despite these articulated best practices, allowing DTC-GTCs to
self-regulate simply may not be in the best interest of the consumer.
Self-regulation certainly does not guarantee any consumer privacy.
That became quite evident when FamilyTreeDNA entered into an
agreement with the FBI to allow the government agency to test DNA
samples in their database to obtain familial matches." Even worse, by
the time the company made the announcement, FamilyTreeDNA already had been sharing this information without prior notice to its
customers.5 4 Ironically, FamilyTreeDNA was an original signatory to
the Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing Services, but
after its announcement, was removed as a supporter.-5 It was the first
time a DTC-GTC had voluntarily given "routine access to customer's
data." 5 6 According to an op-ed piece published on The Future of Privacy Forum, "unfettered law enforcement access to genetic information on commercial services presents substantial privacy risks.""
FamilyTreeDNA's agreement is out of step with consumer expectations. Leading genetic testing companies understand that when
users send in their DNA to learn more about their health or heritage,
they do not expect their genetic data to become part of an FBI genetic
lineup. FamilyTreeDNA users have not received a meaningful notice
or opportunity to opt-in or opt-out of these searches. If this agreement remains in place and valid legal process is not obtained before
access to genetic data is provided to the FBI, individuals may be erroneously swept up in investigations simply because their DNA was
found near a crime scene or at a location where a victim or suspect
lived or worked. Genetic profiles turned over to the FBI may also be
covertly reused by the FBI on other commercial sites.s
This situation highlights the very reason why self- regulation
alone, unfortunately, is not the solution. The reality is that there is
53. Kristen V. Brown & Bloomberg, A Major DNA-Testing Company Is Sharing Some of
Its Data With the FBI. Here's Where it Draws the Line, FORTUNE (Feb. 1, 2019), https://fortune.
com/2019/02/01/genetic-testing-consumer-DNA-familytreeDNA-fbil.
54. Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits to Sharing Genetic Data With F.B.I., N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/business/family-tree-DNA-fbi.html;
John Verdi & Carson Martinez, FamilyTreeDNA Agreement with FBI Creates Privacy Risks,
FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Feb. 6, 2019), https://fpf.org/2019/02/06/familytreeDNA-agree
ment-with-fbi-creates-privacy-risks/.
55. John Verdi & Carson Martinez, FamilyTreeDNA Agreement with FBI Creates Privacy
Risks, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Feb. 6, 2019), https://fpf.org/2019/02/06/familytreeDNAagreement-with-fbi-creates-privacy-risks/.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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nothing to prevent a DTC-GTC or a genealogy research cite from doing the exact same thing that FamilyTreeDNA did with its database.
The current Privacy Best Practices also provides absolutely no real
consumer protection from other companies that may obtain this information by, for example, a direct purchase of the DTC-GTC or a
fourth party that is assisting in a law enforcement investigation. In
2018, pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline purchased a 300-milliondollar equity stake in 23andMe."
Had they purchased 23andMe rather than just a share, there
would be nothing binding them to adhere to the Privacy Best Practices
as they relate to law enforcement uses. Disclosures by a pharmaceutical company like Glaxo would perhaps be under heavier scrutiny because of laws like GINA and HIPAA, but the same is not true for a
non-pharmaceutical entity either in the United States or elsewhere.
In addition, even though the European Union, through the General
Data Protection Regulation ("the GDPR") has taken steps to protect
the privacy of its citizens, the same is not true of companies in other
countries where individual privacy is not paramount. Thus, while
there surely may exist incentives for DTC-GTCs to protect the privacy
of their consumers, other more compelling considerations, financial or
otherwise, may prevail while a consumer's privacy takes a back seat.
b.

Existing Governmental Regulations

Genetic privacy does have protection in certain situations related
to the healthcare and insurance industries. There are three main areas
that current laws, both state and federal, protect: (1) discrimination;
(2) data security; and (3) regulation of genetic testing.' GINA and its
state counterparts, protect individuals from discrimination by employers and insurance companies."1 HIPAA protects genetic information
62
in research and clinical settings, but it focuses on data security.
59. Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to 23andMe's Genetic Data.
Should You Be Concerned?, TiME (July 26, 2018), https://time.com/5349896/23andme-glaxosmith-kline/.
Data,
60. Rhys Dipshan, Giving Away Your Genes: US Laws' Blind Spot With 4DNA
44 9
LAW.COM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=C6873221-Oefe- b - 0fb-aO
ccfl997e26&pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-AMLAWR-gmk45edgdi&pdbypasscitatordocs=
False&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true.
61. Id.
62. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of
the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 35, 40 (2018); Dipshan, supra note 60.
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HIPAA, however, only applies to certain entities and DTC-GTCs
do not usually qualify." If DTC-GTCs do not qualify, research sites
like GEDmatch certainly do not either. The third and last category,
regulations of genetic testing, are usually found in state laws.' Like
GINA and HIPAA, these are laws that mostly govern in cases of insurance, employment and health care organizations.6 5 For example,
genetic testing laws in Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma and Rhode Island and South Carolina require a person's consent before their genetic data is
disclosed.'
From the consumer protection perspective the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") has the authority to investigate and prosecute
DTC-GTCs for deceptive or unfair privacy policies or terms of use."
That being said, any deceptive or unfair privacy practices or terms of
use have not been effectively used to protect users from law enforcement searches. When it comes to consumers using DTC-GTCs, none
of these laws have provided protection to the innocent consumer from
law enforcement's use of their genetic data to conduct familial DNA
testing, particularly for those who purely are using the DTC-GTCs for
ancestry purposes. Thus, there is no comprehensive regulation that
protects the general privacy rights of consumers who use DTC-GTC
or genetic ancestry research websites. 8
c.

Self-Management: A Heavy Burden Is On The Consumer

One of the arguments that can be made against exercising any
sort of government control over privacy is the notion of "self-management." Self-management is defined as the privacy management of
data by individuals and places the burden of navigating the complex
world of online disclosure and consent squarely on the consumer.6 9
Indeed it might be preferable to have individuals effectively self-man63. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 62, at 40.
64. Dipshan, supra note 60.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 62 at 41 ("The FDA has relatively broad authority
to regulate DTC-GTCs but has thus far exercised "enforcement discretion," limiting its regulation to companies offering certain "health-related" genetic tests").
68. Id. at 40-41.
69. See Tuukka Lehtiniemi & Yki Kortesniemi, Can the Obstacles to Privacy Self-Management be Overcome? Exploring the Consent Intermediary Approach, BIG DATA & Soc'Y 1, 2 (July
2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doilpdf/10.1177/2053951717721935.
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age their data. As with other areas of the law, over-regulation is not
always the best way to solve a problem. There also are individuals
who do not want the government trumping their ability to choose or
decide issues that they may view as private. Still, in the world of online notices, consent and waivers, itself complex enough, the failure to
understand the genetic privacy rights they are giving away may cause
damage beyond what is superficially apparent.
The concept of self-management of data is not a new one. In an
article entitled, "Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma," Daniel Solove discusses the origins of the term "self-management" as it relates to data privacy.7 0 Solove addresses the issue of
"paternalistic" law making to protect privacy versus the more hands
off "libertarian" view and comes to the conclusion that a solution to
7
the self-management dilemma should be a combination of the two.
72
That article, however, did not specifically address genetic privacy.
While the privacy of all data is important, one's genetic data derived from testing merit additional protections that self-regulation using a hands-off approach simply may not be able to address.
Moreover, the privacy of one's own genetic information is not the only
privacy concern at stake. The privacy concern also belongs to the
family members of that individual.
Given the muddy and sometimes convoluted notice provided to
consumers on DTC-GTC websites, individuals may not consider the
possibility that their genetic data may be used by law enforcement,
could be sold to another company, or that a DTC-GTC could go
bankrupt and have its assets and information sold, or that the company itself might change its rules and decide to sell the information
they told the consumer it would not sell. Additionally, no one can
predict what will happen in the future when it comes to scientific and
technological breakthroughs and what scientists will be able to do or
discover using someone's genetic code.
Can that information one day be used against you by a future
employer? By a future insurer? By a genetics company? By a law
enforcement agency? 7 1 Compounding this issue is the concern that,
HARv. L.
70. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the ConsentDilemma, 126
532
0
0
ac
REv. 1880, 1882 (2013), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/809c/bef85855e4c5333af4 74 fe
4b496d2.pdf.
71. Id. at 1901.
72. See id. at 1883.
73. See GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATcH (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm ("We cannot predict what the future holds for DNA or gene-
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"[f]or their part, direct-to-consumer testing companies have been less
than forthright about these dangers, usually burying privacy disclaimers deep in their contracts and refusing to disclose how long they keep
customer data or how it can be used." 74 Research published by Nature found that DTC-GTCs "frequently fail to meet even basic international transparency standards."" Yet, consumers still are expected
to "manage their privacy by weighing the subjective costs and benefits
of data collection. In practice, however, many are neither well informed on the issues of their personal data or feel in control of it."
Additionally, "[p]rivacy self-management has to take into account the
highly divergent preferences people have on the desirable position
along the secrecy-transparency spectrum."" There are "privacy fundamentalists, who have high privacy concerns, pragmatists, who have
some concerns but favour individual choice, and the unconcerned,
who have low concerns and tend to trust data collectors."" Additionally, a consumer's privacy is not static, and privacy decisions are dependent on context. 8
In order to use a DTC-GTC, consumers make the privacy decision at the start of the process when they decide that they want to use
the DTC-GTC, and this is when they are preliminarily expected to
assess the "future harms and benefits." 79 The focus is on the immediate benefit of obtaining the testing.so Thus, "while immediate harms
may be insignificant, long-term harms can develop gradually over
time. Having to make the decision before the outcomes arise is arguably a feature of most human decision-making. However, with personal data, the timing poses particular difficulties due to the inherent
dynamics arising from the data analysis technologies. As harms and
benefits may arise by mechanisms which are not discernable, or do not
yet even exist, the consequences of a disclosure are a moving target.
Yet a consent, once given, is typically in effect indefinitely." 8 ' Addialogy research. We cannot predict what the future will be for GEDmatch. It is possible that, in
the future, GEDmatch will merge with, or operations will be transferred to other individuals or
entities.").
74. Peter Pitts, The Privacy Delusions of Genetic Testing, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2017, 1:26 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/15/the-privacy-delusions-of-genetic-testing/#3277d
e641bba.
75. Lehtiniemi & Kortesniemi, supra note 69, at 2.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Solove, supra note 70, at 1890.
80. Id. at 1891
81. See Lehtiniemi & Kortesniemi, supra note 69, at 3.
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tionally, research shows that there exist cognitive problems that hin2
der a person's ability to make informed choices about their data.8
According to Solove, "people's actual ability to make such informed
and rational decisions does not even come close to the vision contemplated by privacy self-management.""
One of the issues relates to the fact that consumers are not wellinformed with the current click-wrap, "notice and choice" model that
almost all online companies use. DTC-GTCs, much like every other
internet company, uses the "notice and choice" model for disclosures.84 According to the Notice and Choice Framework, notice must
be provided so that the consumer can make a "Choice." The word
"Choice" translates to the consumer consenting to whatever has been
set forth in the Notice. "[A]t its simplest, choice means giving consumers options as to how any personal information collected from
them may be used. Specifically, choice relates to secondary uses of
information-i.e., uses beyond those necessary to complete the contemplated transaction."8
There does not appear to be much difference between the Notice
and Choice Framework used by DTC-GTCs and the Notice and
Choice Framework used by other online providers of services. While
the method is the same, the information it pertains to is not. The privacy of information such as date of birth, address, or gender, for example, cannot be compared to genetic information. Nonetheless,
whether it is the purchase of software or providing DNA for a genetic
test, the burden rests with the consumer either to accept the terms and
notices, to walk away from the purchase or not use the service, or to
purchase the item. 8 6 Thus, at the moment when consumers have psychologically committed to the purchase, they must either click through
very lengthy notices or simply hit "I accept."" If the consumer does
not accept all the terms and conditions, the consumer will not be able
to complete the purchase of the test kit.

82. See Solove, supra note 70, at 1883.
83. Id.
84. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 46, at 43.
85. Id. at 44.
86. See Solove, supra note 70, at 1884.
87. It is no wonder that in one 2015 European poll, 18% of respondents said they read
privacy policies fully and 49% only partially read them. https:/ec.europa.eucommfrontoffice/
publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_sum-en.pdf.
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d.

Consent

The biggest privacy issue with the self-management of DTCGTCs is therefore that of consent. The notion is that by agreeing to
the terms and conditions of the DTC-GTCs, the consumers have provided consent, which may waive a variety of rights they may have had
regarding the privacy of their genetic data. The problem with consent
given in the typical click-wrap form is that genetic testing is not like
other consumer products. If, for example, a consumer wants to add
specialized testing, which is provided by 23andMe to test for Parkinson's, Alzheimer's, or BRCA1 and/or BRCA2, they must agree to all
the terms at the commencement of the process or forego testing on
that site. If someone else would like to use, for example, Ancestry.com to track down a long-lost relative, they too must do the same.
That includes the acknowledgment that the police can access their genetic information.
Moreover, the problem is not just that consent is buried in the full
panoply of disclosures. There is no consistency in how one consents to
particular situations. For example, in the case of notice that law enforcement may have access to a consumer's genetic information,
FamilyTreeDNA users are automatically opted in to allow law enforcement to see their profile." Should they wish to not expose themselves to a law enforcement search, they would have to know to go to
settings and opt out." On the other hand, in May 2019, GEDmatch
changed its policy, which was the same as FamilyTreeDNA's, and currently consumers must opt in to allow law enforcement to use their
genetic profile.'
In the European Union, the GDPR has provided rules regarding
valid consent. Article 7 states:
"1. Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall
be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to
processing of his or her personal data.
2. If the data subject's consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for
consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguisha88. Law Enforcement Matching - Frequently Asked Questions, FAMILY TREE DNA, https://
www.familytreeDNA.comllearn/ftDNA/law-enforcement-faq/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2019).
89. Id.
90. Amy Docker Marcus, Customers Handed Over Their DNA. The Company Let the FBI
Take a Look, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2019, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/customershanded-over-their-dna-the-company-let-the-fbi-take-a-look-11566491162.
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ble from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible
form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration
which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be
binding.
3. The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her
consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the
lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal.
Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof.
It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.
4. When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a
contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the
performance of that contract." 9 1
The GDPR does not directly address the law enforcement notice
issues, but it does give guidance on how better to provide notice and
obtain consent from DTC-GTC consumers. Its requirement in section

2 that consent must be clearly distinguishable when it pertains to different matters is a step in the right direction for making consent issues
clearer to the consumer. For example, it also provides for a right to
withdraw consent. Finally, section 4 addresses the problem of making
services conditional on consent, something that occurs in DTC-GTCs,
thereby calling into question the validity of the consent. Nonetheless,
the GDPR still puts most of the burden on the consumer and does not
address the impact to family members of the consumer.9 2

On the state level, some legislators also have begun to tackle the
confusing consent notices used by DTC-GTCs. In early 2020, several
representatives in the state of Washington introduced a bill that contains, inter alia, the following language:
Sec. 2. (1) To safeguard the privacy, confidentiality, security, and
integrity of a consumer's genetic data, a direct-to-consumer genetic
testing company shall: (a) Provide clear and complete information
regarding the company's policies and procedures for collection, use,
or disclosure of genetic data by making available to a consumer: (i)
A high-level privacy policy overview that includes basic, essential
information about the company's collection, use, or disclosure of
genetic data; and (ii) A prominent, publicly available, and easy to
91. Art. 7 GDPR Conditions for Consent, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdpr-info.eu/art7-gdpr/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2019) (emphasis added).
92. Mark MacCarthy, It's Time for a Uniform National Privacy Law, CIO (Aug. 23, 2018,
11:49 AM), https://www.cio.com/article/3300106/it-s-time-for-a-uniform-nationa-privacy-law.
html.
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readprivacy notice that includes, at a minimum, information about
the company's data collection, consent, use, access, disclosure,
transfer, security, and retention and deletion practices; (emphasis
added) 93
Should this become law, it certainly would be a step in the right direction, but without more states following suit, there is little protection

for the millions of other users.
e.

Anonymity, Deidentification and Privacy
Contrary to what consumers may think, using DTC-GTC compa-

nies does not ensure anonymity. According to a 23andMe cofounder,

Linda Avey, "it's a fallacy to think that genomic data can be fully
anonymized." 94

Even though DTC-GTCs say that they maintain anonymity of individuals and that they scrub the data so that it is "deidentified," the

fact is that even the Privacy Guidelines themselves state that the
deidentified information of individuals does not "strongly protect"
them from reidentification: "Deidentification and Genetic Data:
Deidentified information is not subject to the restrictions in this policy, provided that the deidentification measures taken establish strong
assurance that the data is not identifiable. "We note that currently,
Genetic Data held at the individual-level that has been de-identified
cannot be represented as strongly protecting individualsfrom re-identification, based upon existing deidentificationtools and standards. Such
data may be protected in other ways and used for research with appropriate consent and security controls"95
Even if consumers do take the time to delve a little deeper into
the methods used for de-identification or what that actually means for
privacy, doing so would unlikely clarify the situation for them. In a

footnote, the Privacy Guidelines cite the U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services Guidance on Methods of Deidentification for
HIPAA, which provides a rather complex set of procedures for any
person to completely understand.9 6 Thus, assuming that a consumer
93. 2020 Wash. Sess. Laws HB 2485.
94. See Pitts, supra note 74.
95. See Future Of Privacy Forum, supra note 48, at 5 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at n. 18; see Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identificationof Protected Health
Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.
gov/hipaalfor-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html (last visited Aug.
3, 2019) (presenting guidance for the HIPAA Safe Harbor Method).
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has even gone this far, without a genetics background, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Guidance is unlikely to shed
any light on the issue. Providing the consumer with information about
their efforts to maintain anonymity, if anything, gives consumers a
false sense of security. Other sections of the notices in some DTCGTCs support that idea.
For example, Paragraph 6 of 23andMe's Privacy Policy, entitled Security Measures, states: De-identification/Pseudonymization. Registration Information is stripped from Sensitive Information, including
Genetic and Self-Reported Information. This data is then assigned a
randomly generated ID so an individual cannot reasonably be
identified.9 7
However, what is readily apparent is that law enforcement can
and does get information that can be reidentified by someone, either
within the DTC-GTCs or by some other party. For example,
23andMe's Privacy Statement states:
As required by law: Under certain circumstances your Personal
Information may be subject to processing pursuant to laws, regulations, judicial or other government subpoenas, warrants, or orders.
For example, we may be required to disclose Personal Information in
coordination with regulatory authorities in response to lawful requests
by public authorities, including to meet national security or law enforcement requirements. 23andMe will preserve and disclose any and
all information to law enforcement agencies or others if required to do
so by law or in the good faith belief that such preservationor disclosure
is reasonably necessary to: (a) comply with legal or regulatoryprocess
(such as a judicial proceeding, court order, or government inquiry) or
obligations that 23andMe may owe pursuant to ethical and other professional rules, laws, and regulations; (b) enforce the 23andMe Terms
of Service and other policies; (c) respond to claims that any content
violates the rights of third parties; or (d) protect the rights, property,
or personal safety of 23andMe, its employees, its users, its clients, and
the public. View our Transparency Report for more information."
Much like the other large DTC-GTCs, 23andMe's Privacy Policy
makes clear that 23andMe will abide by a subpoena, warrant, judicial
proceeding, court order, or government inquiry and turn over information about the consumer if required to do so by law.
97. Privacy Highlights, 23ANDME (July 17, 2018), https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/
(last visited September 9, 2019).
98. Id.
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It also goes on to say, somewhat vaguely, that it will also turn the
consumer's information over due to "obligations that 23andMe may
owe pursuant to ethical and other professional rules, laws, and regulations."9 9 It is unclear how broadly this part of the policy is applied by
the DTC-GTC or what exact information they will provide.
Thus, de-identification of data does not mean that consumers
have true anonymity when the data can be re-identified. Recent high
publicity criminal cases prove that anonymity is not even a bump in
the road when the police use third party familial DNA testing to find a
suspect. The samples and results can be re-identified quite easily.
More worrisome is the fact that with open source sites like
GEDmatch they are an ". . . open source trove of potential leads,
which, unlike forensic databases, contains genetic bits of code that can
be tied to health data and other personally identifiable
information.""o
Additionally, GEDmatch's Terms of Service and Privacy Policy
states, "GEDmatch exists to provide DNA and genealogy tools for
comparison and research purposes. It is supported entirely by users,
volunteers, and researchers. DNA and Genealogical research, by its
very nature, requires the sharing of information. Because of that,
users participating in this Site agree that their information will be
shared with other users."10 1
Of course, it is fair to assume that to the average reader using this
site, the other users are people like them, who are attempting to conduct DNA or genealogical research. It also is not clear what information is being shared.
Moreover, a consumer can upload not only their own raw DNA
data, but they can upload the DNA of a person for whom they serve
as guardian, the DNA of a person who has given the user authority to
upload their data to GEDmatch, the DNA of a deceased person, [and]
DNA that is "obtained and authorized by law enforcement to identify
a perpetrator of a violent crime against another individual, where 'violent crime is defined as murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated rape, robbery, or aggravated assault."10 2 Interestingly, by their
99. Id.
100. Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fightingis Family Tree Forensics, WIRED (Dec.
26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-crime-fighting-is-family-treeforensics/.
101. See GEDmatch, supra note 73.
102. Id.
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own definition, DNA from a "non-aggravated" rape case would not
be authorized as raw data that can be submitted. How GEDmatch
defines an aggravated rape is not stated. 0 3
Their sentence construction also makes it appear that a robbery
need not be "aggravated."104 Perhaps it is using definitions from the
company's state of incorporation or location, but given that it presumably works with law enforcement from around the country, such vague
word usage merely adds to consumer confusion.
III.
a.

LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF GENETIC DATA AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Putting Away the "Bad Guys"

At the beginning of any genetic privacy discussion in the DTCGTC and genealogical research arenas, it bears mentioning that there
may be multiple stakeholders of that right. Among them are: (1) the
consumer; (2) all of the members of the consumer's immediate and
extended family, alive or not yet born who share the consumer's DNA
profile (including the target of a law enforcement who may ultimately
be charged with a crime); (3) the DTC-GTC company itself that may
claim ownership rights as a result of their agreement with the consumer; (4) and any other company who may claim ownership rights,
for example, via a purchase of any or all of the Data the DTC-GTC
has.
At the heart of this discussion, however, is the original consumer
and, for purposes of this article, the focus largely remains there. As in
so many situations in which an individual's privacy right has been balanced against a concern for "safety," privacy rights sometimes have
been ceded for the "greater good." In the world of criminal justice,
unfortunately, it sometimes seems no price is too high for some as
long as we "put away the bad guys," especially when the "bad guy" is
someone who has committed numerous, heinous crimes like the
Golden State Killer.
Those arguments might work better with something less intrusive,
like fingerprints, but not one's genetic code. DNA is different. The
genome that makes an individual unique and carries with it such private information is not like a fingerprint. As Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia astutely noted in Arizona v. Hicks, "there is nothing
103. See GEDmatch, supra note 73.
104. Id.
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new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all."1 5
Of course, the compelling "greater good" arguments are not just
restricted to "putting bad guys away." Some might argue that a future
where everyone's genetic profile is in a centralized database would be
safer for society. Others may argue that having everyone's DNA in
one database would be more racially diverse than the existing CODIS
database is.1 Or, for example, when balancing privacy with the
"greater good" of finding a cure for Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, or cancer, some would argue that individual genetic privacy should cede to
medical advancements or cures for these diseases, and that genetic
codes, even in DTC-GTC databases, should be used in that
research.10 7

The arguments are no doubt compelling, but they do not overcome the magnitude of the societal invasion of privacy. No one can
argue that catching criminals, especially those who have conirnitted
the most heinous of crimes, is not a valid interest. Moreover, no one
would argue against finding a cure for deadly diseases. And indeed, a
universal database may make society safer and it may be less racially
biased than the CODIS database. However, a universal database
would require the permanent relinquishment of every single person's
most private information.
b.

Law Enforcement's Use of DTC-GTCs

The serious nature of the relinquishment of genetic privacy cannot be overstated or, for that matter, easily understood by non-geneticists. Moreover, those genetic data privacy rights are that of not only
the consumer, but the consumer's entire family. What is particularly
concerning about genetic privacy is what we do not know about DNA
and its future uses. The average person who has used these DTCGTCs or genealogy websites most likely is not an expert on genetics.
Even non-geneticists who happen to know a bit more about genetics
than the average person cannot predict what the magnitude of their
privacy violation may be in an evolving genetics world. Its potential
uses, both for good and bad, and the permanent privacy concerns

&

105. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1987).
106. Kirsten Dedrickson, Universal DNA Databases:A Way to Improve Privacy?, 4 J.L.
BIOSCIENCES 637, 647 (2018).
107. This genetic data used in research may have more protections under GINA and HIPAA
than other types of genetic data.
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DNA and its data have are not easily graspable. The only certain
thing we do know about DNA and genetic data is that we cannot comprehend or predict what advances in DNA we will be able to accomplish in the future. Thus, it makes sense that the average consumer
may not have immediate concerns about something they cannot even
fathom may occur. Herein lies the problem: consumers cannot fear
what they cannot even foresee to be a danger or a threat. 108
Familial DNA testing through DTC-GTCs is being used more
and more by law enforcement, although it is unclear how many times
they have done so. 1 0 9 Familial DNA testing is when a genetic profile
is created from the DNA sample from a crime scene and then run
through a database to determine whether another genetic profile or
profiles in that database are similar to it. That match will then provide
an investigative lead into determining who might be a relative of the
potential suspect.
According to its Transparency Report, current as of February 14,
2020 23andMe has had 7 law enforcement requests for the data of 10
users and has not provided any data without the "prior explicit consent of the users.1 10 Ancestry.com's 2019 Transparency Report states
that in 2019 it received nine "valid" law enforcement requests for information and it provided information in six out of the nine.1 11 Eight
of the nine were requests for investigations for credit card misuse,
fraud, and identity theft. 1 12 However, one request was for access to
Ancestry's DNA database pursuant to a warrant. According to its
Transparency report, Ancestry challenged the validity of that request
on "jurisdictional grounds" and did not provide any information to
the police.11 3 In 2018 Ancestry.com received 10 requests, complied
108. During the writing of this article, I had more than a dozen informal conversations with
friends, family and acquaintances curious about the topic of my article. Interestingly, nearly all
of them had done some sort of DTC-GTC testing or were thinking about doing it. When I asked
about whether they had concerns about privacy, each of them gave me similar responses. They
all told me it was anonymous so they were not worried. None of them had read the entire notice
and consent sections of the websites. One person told me she had nothing to hide. However,
when asked about whether they had not given any thought to the potential future uses of their
(and their family members' DNA) by some unknown third party, they had not.
109. Some DTC-GTCs publish transparency reports, but not all do. This is an entirely selfregulated reporting decision by a DTC-GTC. Additionally, it is unknown how many times, for
example, a law enforcement agency has used a service like GEDmatch surreptitiously.
110. See Transparency Report, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/transparency-report/
(last visited February 24, 2020).
111. Id.
112. Ancestry 2019 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/trans
parency (Aug. 3, 2019).
113. Id.
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with 7, and that all the requests were for investigations for credit card
misuse, fraud, and identity theft." 4 It also states that it received no
"valid" requests for genetic information and did not provide any genetic information to law enforcement in 2018.1"
After much searching on FamilyTreeDNA's website for a Transparency Report, this statement was found in the seventh and final section of the FamilyTreeDNA Law Enforcement Guide:
"FamilyTreeDNA is working on publishing an updated Transparency
Report that contains details on all law enforcement requests for user
information that we receive. This report will also be updated to in6
clude the number of forensic samples and files we have received.""
It also states, "Unless we are legally barred from doing so, our policy
for any request of additional user information is to notify users of the
request and supply a copy of the request prior to disclosure. In the
U.S., law enforcement officials may prohibit this disclosure by submitting a court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) or state statute
signed by a judge. We will assess requests not to notify users from law
enforcement outside the U.S. under applicable law. For all requests,
we may also elect, in our sole discretion, not to notify the user if doing
so would be considered counterproductive and if we are not legally
permitted to do so."117
GEDmatch has publicly stated that approximately 50 law enforcement agencies or their representatives have submitted samples to
8
GEDmatch and that approximately 150 cases have been submitted.1"
Another genetics laboratory that routinely works with law enforcement, Parabon Nanolabs, has stated that its work has yielded almost
36 arrests. 11 9 Whether or not there is overlap between these figures is
unclear. The methodology used by law enforcement to generate leads
through familial DNA testing and the creation of a genetic tree of
suspects can vary. In some instances, investigators take DNA from a
crime scene and send it to a genetic laboratory, like Parabon Nano114. Id.
115. Id.
116. FamilyTreeDNA Law Enforcement Guide, FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytree
DNA.comlegal/law-enforcement-guide (last visited Aug. 3, 2019).
117. Id.
118. Amy Docker Marcus, The FBI Came Calling. The DNA Firm Answered., WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 2019.
119. Madison Pauly, Police Are Increasingly Taking Advantage of Home DNA Tests. There
Aren't Any Regulations to Stop It, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://
www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/03/genetic-genealogy-law-enforcement-golden-statekiller-cece-moore/.
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labs. They then create a DNA profile that is like one a consumer
would get from a DTC-GTC like 23andMe or Ancestry. That profile
can be uploaded to GEDmatch to see if there are matches.
There can be more than one match of relatives to the 9th degree. 1 2 0 Another example of how law enforcement can build a genetic
family tree of suspects is illustrated by their collaboration with FamilyTreeDNA. In 2018, FamilyTreeDNA made headlines when it shared
its DNA database with federal investigators without having notified
its users.121 Apparently, FamilyTreeDNA had allowed the FBI to
search its database of consumer genetic profiles to solve cold murder
and rape cases.1 22 The arrangement between FamilyTreeDNA appears to have been the first DTC-GTC to provide information knowingly to the government without a subpoena or warrant.1 2 3 When it
finally did notify its customers, it informed them that the FBI would
be able to access their database like any other user would.1 2 4 However, the arrangement between the FBI and FamilyTreeDNA goes
further than allowing the FBI full access to its database. Pursuant to
the agreement, FamilyTreeDNA's genetic testing laboratory also creates data profiles from the FBI's DNA samples, which will then allow
the FBI to use them to search other genealogy websites.1 25 "The
method is being used more and more by police departments around
the country. In the process, they have called upon geneticists to assist
them in creating forensic family trees in order to solve cases."1 2 6
Familial DNA testing is prohibited by the FBI and the Agency
cannot run those searches through the Combined DNA Index System
("CODIS") or the National Combined DNA Index System ("NDIS"),
which is part of CODIS, although familial DNA testing is allowed in
certain states.' 2 7 In Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Michi120. See Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting is Family Tree Forensics, WIRED
(Dec. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-crime-fighting-is-famrilytree-forensics/.
121. Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits to Sharing Genetic Data with F.B.L, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/business/family-tree-DNA-fbi.html.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Press Release: Connecting Families and Saving Lives, FAMILYTREEDNA (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://blog.familytreeDNA.com/press-release-connecting-families-and-saving-lives/.
125. Id.
126. See MOLTENI, supra note 120.
127. See Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratorylbiometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Aug. 8, 2019)
("Are familial searches performed at NDIS? No, familial searching is not currently performed at
NDIS); see also 73 Fed.Reg. 74937 (Dec.10, 2008); see also Lauren Keiper, More U.S. States Use
Familial DNA as Forensic Tool, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2011, 8:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
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gan, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, familial DNA
testing is legal and authorized for searches in CODIS/NDIS.1 28 Maryland and Washington DC expressly prohibit familial searches done in
CODIS/NDIS.1 2 9 Additionally, on January 22, 2019, Maryland's
House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on House Bill 30, introduced by Maryland State Senator Charles Sydnor III. House Bill 30
sought to amend Maryland's statute prohibiting familial DNA testing
in the CODIS/NDIS database. The amendment to the statute would
read: "A person may not perform a search of the statewide DNA
database OR ANY OTHER DNA OR GENEALOGICAL DATA
BASE for the purpose of identification of an offender in connection
with a crime for which the offender may be a biological relative of the
individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired." (caps original,
emphasis added). That bill failed, and in February 2020, another bill
was introduced again attempting to regulate various types of genetic
database searches 3 0
Other state legislators have been attempting to address the concerns about familial DNA testing. A Utah State Representative has
introduced a bill that would limit the use by police of genetic
databases for familial matches and the submission of genetic information to a genetic genealogy service. The Bill also would prohibit the
police from entering false information or making a false representation to a genetic testing company or a genetic genealogy company.131
The familial DNA matching process has been done through
CODIS and its related databases. The samples in those databases are
samples that have been submitted of individuals processed through
either a state or federal criminal justice system. That stands in stark
contrast to law enforcement's use of GEDmatch, an open source genarticle/us-crime-DNA-familial-idUSTRE72T2QS20110331 (allowed in Colorado, California, and
Virginia, and under consideration in Pennsylvania).
128. FBI, supra note 124.125 https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/
codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
129. See Avi Selk, The Ingenious and 'Dystopian' DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the
'Golden State Killer' Suspect, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.sltrib.coml
news/nation-world/2018/04/28/the-ingenious-and-dystopian-DNA-technique-police-used-tohunt-the-golden-state-killer-suspect/ ("Familial DNA searches, in fact, had an 83 percent failure
rate in a 2014 British study, Wired wrote. This is part of the reason that many warn against the
practice, even as law enforcement agencies master its uses.").
130. DNA Databases Are Boon to Police But Menace to Privacy, Critics Say, THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/
02/20/dna-databases-are-boon-to-police-but-menace-to-privacy-critics-say (last visited Feb. 26,
2020)., http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2020RS/bills/sb/sb0848F.pdf
131. Id.
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ealogical research website, MyHeritage.com, 23andMe, Ancestry.com,
and other DTC-GTCs like them where innocent citizens are submitting their DNA for reasons entirely personal to them. Thus, the important difference between familial DNA testing in the CODIS
database and the use of DTC-GTCs is that the collection of samples
submitted through CODIS are not only regulated and restricted, but
they are of individuals who have been arrested and/or convicted of
crimes. In stark contrast, law enforcement is now able to scour private DNA databases that contain the DNA of entirely innocent individuals. With the introduction of DTC-GTCs without any effective
controls on the use of that DNA, the threat of use by law enforcement
raises even more concerns. With their ever-growing database of DNA
profiles, DTC-GTCs and "open source" genealogy websites like
GEDmatch have become of great interest and use to law enforcement
agencies, with or without the permission of the customers.1 3 2
The big-picture view of the future of DNA and its uses is a complex one. The use of DNA testing in criminal cases always has been a
double-edged sword. DNA testing has proven to be an extraordinary
tool in proving people's innocence. The strides made in the Innocence
Movement would not have been possible without DNA testing.
Moreover, as more samples are obtained from those arrested, the
CODIS database grows and allows law enforcement to use those samples for comparison. Thus, there exists an uncomfortable relationship
between the increase in exonerations through DNA testing and the
growth and growing use of databases. One could not exist without the
other. However, the CODIS database apparently has not sufficed.
Law enforcement has, with increasing frequency, turned to DTC-GTC
and other genealogy databases to solve cases. It is important to note
that the CODIS database and the private genealogy databases differ
in that, "[g]enetic genealogy . .. is drawn from hundreds of thousands
of genetic variants called SNPs (for single nucleotide polymorphisms).
The technique can give away details about a person's appearance,
medical conditions and possibly even predisposition to mental health
problems." 1 3 3 At least one journalist has referred to the ever-growing

132. MOLTENI supra note 120. The use of websites like GEDmatch currently do not require
court orders
133. Tina Hesman Saey, Genealogy Companies Could Struggle to Keep Clients' Data from
Police, SCIENCE NEWS (June 10, 2019, 12:00 pm), https://www.sciencenews.orgarticle/forensic-ge
netic-genealogy-companies-police-privacy

2020]

143

Howard Law Journal
private genetic databases as the soon-to-be de facto national
database1 34
Recently, the Golden State Killer of California was identified as
Joseph DeAngelo and captured using familial DNA testing through
GEDmatch. 3 The police uploaded a fake profile using the DNA
from the case.13 6 Between 1976 and 1986, the Golden State killer had
killed 12 people and raped 45 women.13 7 One of DeAngelo's distant
relatives had uploaded their profile into the GEDmatch database and
police were able to get a partial match to the genetic evidence they
had uploaded with the fake profile they created. 3 8 Law enforcement
does not actually need court approval to use GEDmatch or, for that
matter, any other genetic database. 3 9 Moreover, there is very little
that currently can be done to prevent them from creating false profiles
and submitting samples in that manner.
In 2019, GEDmatch violated its own policy by restricting exactly
which types of cases it would grant police permission to search its
database for when it allowed Utah police to search its database in an
aggravated assault and burglary case. Police submitted the DNA profile and matched it to a 17- year-old's great uncle. The 17- year- old
was subsequently arrested and charged with aggravated assault and
burglary.'40
c.

The Fourth Amendment and the Innocent Citizen

Privacy is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. The Founding
Fathers went to great lengths to protect citizens from governmental
intrusion and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been evolving for
134. Natalie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database, SLATE
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-DNA-database-law-enforcementgenetic-genealogy.html.
135. SELK, supra note 129.
136. Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police's Go-To Genealogy Database,THE
ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-policegenealogy-database/561695/.
137. Avi Selk, The ingenious and 'dystopian' DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the
'Golden State Killer' suspect, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/
news/nation-world/2018/04/28/the-ingenious-and-dystopian-dna-technique-police-used-to-huntthe-golden-state-killer-suspect/.
138. Id.
139. Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fightingis Family Tree Forensics, WuRED (Dec.
26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-crime-fighting-is-family-treeforensics/.
140. Terry Spencer, Use of Online DNA Databasesby Law Enforcement Leads to Backlash
and Website Changes, PBS (June 7, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/use-of-onlinedna-databases-by-law-enforcement-leads-to-backlash-and-website-changes.
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hundreds of years since then. In the context of law enforcement's use
of DTC-GTCs, modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must grapple with a very basic question: does the Fourth Amendment offer any
protection to the millions of innocent individuals who use these genetic databases?1 41 In the past, scholars have argued for an Innocence
Model of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.1 4 2 Others have maintained that the innocent are irrelevant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. And while remedies for privacy violations exist in tort and civil
rights actions,1 43 those remedies, when offered for a violation of the
privacy right stemming from genetic material, submitted for one's own
personal use, do not, and cannot, undo the irrevocable damage that
occurs when a person's genetic information is obtained and used by
law enforcement and other entities merely to create a potential suspect family tree.
Historically, Fourth Amendment concerns were not exclusively
about criminal cases and exclusion of evidence at criminal trials, but
also were about civil actions brought by citizens.'" According to Professor Akil Reed Amar, the Fourth Amendment did not at the onset
require exclusion of evidence in criminal cases, but rather it presupposed civil trespass suits.' 4 5 "The 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects' presupposes and conjures
up tort law, which protects persons and property from unreasonable
invasions. Here too, textual analysis is strongly supported by historyno framer ever argued for exclusion, nor did any early commentator,
or judge-and by common sense: unlike tort law, exclusion rewards the
guilty but gives absolutely zilch to the innocent citizen, whom the government seeks to hassle."1 46 Thus, Amar argued, warrants were
141. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 1457, 1461 (1996) https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?arti
cle=1813&context=facpub. See also Tonja Jacobi and Ross Berlin, Supreme Irrelevance: The
Court's Abdication in Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence, 51 UNIv. OF CAL. DAVIs 2033, 2038
(2018).
142. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in FourthAmendment Jurisprudence,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 1457, 1463 (1996) https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgiviewcontent.cgi?arti
cle=1813&context=facpub.
143. Peter Swire, ProfessorPeter Swire Testimony in Irish High Court Case-Chapter7: Individual Remedies in US Privacy Law, ALSTON & BIRD (last visited Aug. 3, 2019), https://
www.alston.com/-/media/files/insights//peter-swire-testimony-documents/chapter-7-individualremedies-in-us-privacy-law.pdf?la=en.
144. Akhil R. Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 53, 64 (1996-97), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi
?article=1950&context=fss.papers.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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meant to immunize the government from tort claims. 1 4 7 Nonetheless,
the trajectory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence moved from the
more general privacy focus over the course of several hundred years
to one that is almost purely focused on exclusion of evidence at
trial. 148

Thus, modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seems ill-prepared to handle the collapse of genetic privacy rights that may come
with an unregulated genetic information world. It is fair to assume
that as private genetic databases grow, law enforcement will turn to
those databases with much greater frequency to solve crimes. On
many of these sites, innocent citizens who would like to obtain genetic
testing or to do genealogy research are left without a choice but to
"consent" to allowing law enforcement to rummage through, and possibly use, their genetic data or they must forgo testing altogether on
the vast majority of DTC-GTCs.
Many legal arguments made in support of allowing law enforcement to obtain and test these genetic samples have focused upon that
Third-Party Doctrine, which is premised on the notion that information voluntarily provided to a third party vitiates any privacy claim
one may have and that no warrant is needed by the police in order to
obtain that information.14 9 In Carpenter v. United States, however,
the Supreme Court restricted the use of the Third Party Doctrine and
held that the police need warrants to obtain historical cell-site location
information about a person's whereabouts from a third party.15 0

Jus-

tice Roberts, writing for the majority, observed that there have been
"seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of
not only Carpenter's location but also everyone else's, not for a short
period but for years and years." 15 1 Part of the reasoning included consideration of the fact that these records provide so much information
about their users for so long. 1 5 2
The rationale in Carpentercan be applied to genetic data because
of its nature and because it belongs not only to the consumer, but to
everyone who shares that consumer's genetic information. Genetic
147. Id. at 60.
148. Id. at 64.
149. John Villasenor, What You Need to Know About the Third-Party Doctrine, THE ATLANnc (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/what-you-need-toknow-about-the-third-party-doctrine/282721/.
150. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2207 (2018).
151. Id. at 2219.
152. Id. at 2217.
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data is not like a bank record, a telephone record, or even cell-site
location data. 5 3 The content of those records does not reveal such
personal information to the same extent. Genetic data can provide
information about genetic familial markers, conditions, and other incredibly private details about an individual and their family members.
Additionally, there is support for the argument for greater genetic privacy protection in Carpenter's dissenting opinions. Justice
Kennedy dissented in Carpenterbecause he determined that Carpenter did not have ownership rights or control over the cell-site locations
records and therefore had no expectation of privacy at all. Justice
Gorsuch dissented stating that he would do away with the reasonable
expectation of privacy test (as would Justice Thomas) and the thirdparty doctrine in favor of focusing on whether someone has some sort
of property rights in the information. In contrast to the Carpenter
facts, consumers who use DTC-GTCs do maintain some property
rights. If consumers have the right to request that their information
be deleted and that their samples be destroyed, they maintain control
and ownership to some degree of their genetic data.
The genetic data housed at DTC-GTCs or other genealogy websites ought to be protected by, the Fourth Amendment. Law enforcement should be prohibited from conducting the genetic, modern-day
equivalent of a search pursuant to a writ of assistance.1 5 4 These are
nothing more than genetic dragnet searches when the sole purpose of
going through these databases is to find possible familial DNA
matches in a case where there is no other clue as to who the suspect is.
Without such a prohibition, there is no protection. Justice Scalia said,
"Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it occupies a lower
place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The
1 55
Fourth Amendment must prevail."

While concerns of genetic privacy pervade other areas such as
health care and consumer protection, the constitutional privacy right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is of the utmost concern,
particularly because the intrusion also affects unknowing family mem153. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding no expectation of privacy for
bank records); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding records of telephone
calls have no expectation of privacy).
154. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 501-512 (1995) (detailing history of
American search and seizure case law).
155. Id.
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bers separated by as many as nine degrees. 15 6 These privacy infractions are a world apart from those the courts historically were
accustomed to dealing with during searches by the government. Such
searches usually occurred at a moment in time. If there is an unlawful
search of a home, it may be intrusive at that time, but it also is somewhat final and finite. In contrast, the privacy concern with genetic
materials is more permanent and irreversible and as such cannot be
viewed through the same lens. This rings especially true when the net
is cast so wide as to include the genetic information of millions of
completely innocent individuals use DTC-GTCs or genealogy research websites, which information may then be shared with 4th party
providers in order to build a genetic family suspect tree.
If and when the police do seek a warrant, courts also must act as
vigilant gatekeepers of our privacy rights in these types of cases.
There exist serious issues regarding whether or not search warrants
affecting the privacy rights of millions of people ought to be issued for
these types of database searches when the sole purpose is to obtain a
familial match using the DNA of an innocent citizen. A search warrant requires probable cause, i.e. a fair probability that a search will
result in evidence of a crime being discovered.15 8 Search warrants also
require specificity and particularity. For these reasons, the validity of
these search warrant applications should not be a foregone conclusion. A warrant application for a search of a DTC-GTC or a genealogy research database is no more than a fishing expedition that also
engages in a fair amount of bootstrapping. The only information law
enforcement might possibly obtain is that of an innocent distant relative of an unknown suspect, assuming of course that the police have
not established with probable cause that the suspect's own genetic
profile is in the database. Depending on when in the process the police seek a warrant, it is only a possibility that an unknown suspect's
family member will have submitted a sample to that database. It is
entirely speculative. Even if the application for a search warrant occurs at some point after they have submitted a sample to the database,
the sample matched in the DTC-GTC alone will not directly identify
the suspect. It is only by bootstrapping the information derived from
156. See Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting is Family Tree Forensics, WIRED
(Dec. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-crime-fighting-is-familytree-forensics/.
157. Nothing short of a search warrant should be utilized to obtain evidence from DTCGTCs or a genealogical website.
158. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2320 (1983).
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the DTC-GTC to a second, yet-to-be done testing process, like the
service provided by fourth party providers such as Parabon NanoLabs, genealogy researchers, or hobbyists, that police can link any
possible family members with an actual suspect. Even then, law enforcement only can build a genetic family tree of suspects. Thus, it is
too attenuated, should not establish probable cause, and the judiciary
should exercise extreme caution and restraint in issuing such search
warrants for these types of cases.
At least one court has not taken this cautious approach. In December 2019, the New York Times reported that a Florida detective
announced at a police convention that he had obtained a warrant from
a Florida judge to search the entire GedMatch database containing 1.2
million genetic profiles. What is especially troubling about the warrant is that the judge's order allowed the detective to override the
privacy settings that were selected by users on Gedmatch. Of the 1.2
million Gedmatch users, in fact only 185,000 of the 1.2 million of the
users, roughly 15%, had opted-in to allow law enforcement to view
their genetic profiles.1 5 9 Thus, approximately 1,015,000 people were
subjected to non-consensual searches. Interestingly, that very same
month that the court approved the Gedmatch search, Gedmatch was
acquired by Verogen, Inc., a company that according to its website,
was created exclusively to be a forensics genomic lab. It states,
"Working in partnership with the community, we can elevate the forensic genomics lab's role in preserving public safety-and improve
global justice for all."16 Verogen is a company that already has ties to
law enforcement in that Verogen's next-gen DNA technology has
been approved by the FBI for upload to the National DNA Index
System or NDIS. NDIS allows for DNA comparison of profiles submitted by both federal, state laboratories.1 6
CONCLUSION
Until there is consensus about the unique nature of genetic samples and data and its potential for revealing the most private confidential information about an individual, there can be no easy solution to
159. Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida Judge Just
Said Otherwise, N.Y. TIMEs (2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-databasesearch-warrant.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2020).
160. Company, VEROGEN, https://verogen.com/company/ (last visited Feb 28, 2020).
161. FBI Approves Verogen's Next-Gen Forensic DNA Technology for National DNA Index
System (NDIS), VEROGEN (2019), https://verogen.com/ndis-approval-of-miseq-fgx/ (last visited
Feb 28, 2020).
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genetic privacy. The genetic privacy of consumers who use DTCGTCs should not be treated like other consumer data privacy. Because of the extremely sensitive and unique information about a person's genome, genetic data simply cannot be viewed in the same light
as other data, digital or otherwise.
Nothing short of a complete ban by Congress on law enforcement's use of DTC-GTCs or ban on DTC-GTCs and other genealogical databases sharing such information with law enforcement will
protect consumers, and society in general. Congress could create a
national data privacy law, much like EU has done with the GDPR, or
a free-standing genetic privacy law that prohibits familial DNA
searches of any genealogical database. The same can be said of state
legislatures. A hard and clear line must be drawn on the privacy of an
innocent individual's DNA information that is contained in a DTCGTC or genealogical database. To do less would be to take another
step on the already slippery slope, which will inevitably lead to a complete loss of privacy for not only the person who used the DTC-GTC,
but for that person's entire family.
If federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI cannot, and
do not, employ familial DNA testing using CODIS, which only houses
the DNA of certain arrestees and convicted criminals, it makes absolutely no sense to allow them and other state or local law enforcement
agencies to conduct those very same searches of innocent citizens
through a back door. 1 6 2 Current use of DTC-GTCs amounts to a genetic fishing expedition, especially now as consumers play catch-up on
the importance of protecting their genetic privacy. Such fishing expeditions violate the constitutional privacy rights of innocent citizens
and their families. As DTC-GTCs databases grow larger, law-enforcement's appetite for using DTC-GTCs will grow along with them
and could lead to an unregulated genetic surveillance state. What may
have started as an interest in solving serious homicide cold cases, like
that of the Golden State Killer, has already pivoted into a first line of
defense for solving any and all crimes.16 3

162. Natalie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database, SLATE
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-dna-database-law-enforcementgenetic-genealogy.html.
163. See Natalie Ram, The Genealogy Site That Helped Catch the Golden State Killer is Grappling With Privacy, SLATE (May 29, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/gedmatch-dnaprivacy-update-law-enforcement-genetic-geneology-searches.html.
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At the moment, there really is nothing in the way of DTC-GTCs
deciding to allow the government to utilize their databases to conduct
DNA searches for any and all crimes. For this reason, a genetic privacy law considered by Congress or the states should include a ban on
the use of DTC-GTCs by law enforcement to conduct familial DNA
testing. Whether or not they are inclined to do so remains to be seen.
Perhaps the GEDmatch already has violated its own Terms and Policies when it permitted law enforcement to investigate an aggravated
assault instead of the stated policy that is restricted to homicides, sexual assaults and abductions.
Passing such a blanket law seems unlikely, despite the necessity
for such a hard line. Congress did not act when law enforcement continued to collect historical cell-site data. Rather, it took a decision
from the Supreme Court in Carpenter to hold such warrantless
searches unconstitutional. Given that congressional leaders may not
want to appear "soft" on crime, it does not seem likely that they will
want to ban familial DNA testing completely.
Absent Congressional or state action, there are other measures,
admittedly only stop-gap in nature, that can be taken. First, all courts
should acknowledge and consider the serious consequences of allowing such practices to continue absent strict limits. The Fourth
Amendment's privacy right must be jealously guarded in order to insure the privacy of innocent citizens. The Third- Party Doctrine
should not be applied and nothing short of a search warrant should be
used to gain access to genetic information from a DTC-GTC or any
other genealogical database. In that regard, courts should strictly adhere to the probable cause and specificity and particularity requirements, and not issue search warrants in cases such as these where law
enforcement merely seeks to conduct a fishing expedition in a genetic
database in the hopes of building their genetic suspect tree.
Additionally, even though at least one court was willing to completely ignore the privacy of over a million consumers, all genetic
databases should be required to adopt an express opt-in model like
the one adopted by GEDmatch. Otherwise, consumers have no
choice, but to accept the Notice and Choice model generally used on
DTC-GTCs websites if they seek to use the genetic testing company.
These notices and terms are unnecessarily complex and convoluted
and as such, any blanket type of user consent should not be construed
as a voluntary waiver of any rights to be free of searches by law enforcement. Further, innocent citizens should not have to automati2020]
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cally consent to the possibility of the police using their DNA in order
to use a DTC-GTC, thus any notice of consent without more should
not be deemed a waiver that allows police use. That consent also
should not be part of a long laundry list of notices, buried in a myriad
of other notices, but rather in a separate and distinct format. In that
opt-in notice, transparency about the process and consequences of
their consent should be required as well. Thus, the opt-in notice
should explain, among other things, that by consenting to this use,
their genetic profile and that of their immediate and extended family
members, including the unborn, may be shared with additional parties
other than law enforcement, such as third party geneticists, or ancestry volunteers and that their DNA data may possibly be entered into
other unregulated websites and databases. It also should inform the
consumer that while the use of their DNA may assist in catching a
perpetrator of a crime, it also may implicate other family members
who are innocent. It should state that any privacy rights that the consumer may have had with the DTC-GTC may not apply. Finally, it
should inform the consumer that future unforeseen and unknown use
of their genetic data by unknown companies or individuals is possible.
In conclusion, we, as a society, are at a crossroads. Congress,
State legislatures, and all courts are at a crossroads. The concern
about genetic privacy goes beyond the already significant general data
privacy rights of the consumer. Do citizens want to live in a genetic
surveillance state? Our Founding Fathers could not have imagined a
world where the advances of science could identify a person on the
genetic level. Justice Scalia, in his scathing dissent in Maryland v.
King, aptly warned of a genetic panopticon. His warning applies even
more to the government's use of the genetic information of private
citizens and the concern that we are becoming a genetic surveillance
state. Privacy is something that was then, and is now, recognized as a
fundamental right in the United States. And genetic privacy ought to
be considered sacred.
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